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The following article provides an interesting and practical suggestion for improving the flexibility in
international exchange rates. The article reflects Dr. Schmnitz’s personal opinion, and should not he interpreted
as necessarily representing the official views of the Austrian National Bank.
Re-establishing the Bretton Woods Flexibility
Today there is widespread and growing under-
standing that it has become necessary to ease our
exchange rate system, which has become too rigid,
and to make the original Bretton Woods idea of suf-
ficient flexibility effective again. The Kshort-term)
transitional period of fluctuating exchange rates for
the Deutsche mark has shown that in particular
situations, a greater flexibility in the adjustment ot
exchange rates could be highly advantageous for the
international monetary system.
In searching for ways and means to achieve more
flexibility which, however, still w ould be a limited or
controlled flexibility of exchange rates, there are two
problems which now are to be investigated separately:
1) Which technique for more flexibility is best
suited for specific situations; and
2) What should be changed or amended in the
Articles of Agreement of the IMF so that
those methods may be employed legally?
This article deals primarily with the second
question.
Why More Flexibility of Exchange Rates?
There are quite different motives for calling for
more flexibility in the exchange rates:
It should be made easier for governments to ad-
just exchange rates as it has been envisaged by the
Bretton Woods System, but in fact practiced only
hesitatingly. The postponement of the devaluation of
the French franc from November 1968 (Bonn Con-
ference of the Croup of Ten) to August 1969, and
the delay in the revaluation of the Deutsche mark
until September 1969, brought France a heavy loss in
its international reserves and thus severe exchange
restrictions to the business community, and brought
Germany an undesired and inflationary influx of
foreign exchange.
As long as there is not sufficient international co-
ordination of economic and monetary policies, the
rigidity of exchange rates will continue to cause in-
flationary or deflationary currents to flow from one
country to another. More leeway in the adjustment
of exchange rates could better enable countries to
protect themselves against this. More flexible ex-
change rates would facilitate a more effective use by
central banks of their monetary policy instruments to
regulate the money supply of their countries in the
face of balance-of-payments influences.
In 1951 the IMF was already concerned with the
issue of more flexibility: “The maintenance of a given
exchange rate sometimes is made very difficult either
by a set of internal policies or by the external eco-
nomic forces with which countries must deal. In the
main, these difficulties arise from the fact that cliang-
ing economic forces operate with unequal effects on
various countries.”
Under a dollar standard, large industrial countries
or groups of industrial nations could have the inten-
tion not to link, unconditionally and automatically,
their monetary policies to that of the U.S. authorities.
More flexibility in exchange rates would enable those
countries to keep their price levels stable even if the
United States is not successful in fighting inflation.
The present system of abrupt and not easily rever-
sible alterations of exchange rates favors speculation
because there are no serious financial risks to being
wrong. An increased flexibility in the formation of
exchange rates will increase the risks and there-
‘Annual Report, International Monetary Fund, Washington,
D. C., 1951, p. 37.
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fore should produce more success in combatting
speculation.
In view of the priority accorded to aims of na-
tional economic policy (e.g. monetary stability, full
employment, economic growth), the equilibrium of
the balance of payments is often neglected. More
flexible exchange rates could facilitate, without jeop-
ardizing the national policy goals mentioned, the bal-
ancing of international payments.
How to Get More Flexibility?
Since there are different motives underlying the
call for more flexibility, several proposals to introduce
more flexibility into the exchange rate mechanism
have been made.
The members of the IMF are advised to make
more frequent use of the present provisions of the
Articles of Agreement by adjusting their exchange
rates more often but by smaller steps.
One step further is the proposal to allow exchange
rates to drift slowly and steadily by weeldy, monthly
or quarterly alterations up to a maximum annual rate
of 2 to 3 per cent, either automatically or guided
deliberately (crawling peg — sliding parity). Such
limited exchange rate flexibility is believed to be
small enough to discourage speculation in foreign ex-
change markets, while assuming enough stability for
international trade and payments, and providing suf-
ficient scope for long-run exchange rate adjustments.
Another way to make the system more flexible
would be to widen the limits within which exchange
rates are allowed to fluctuate around their par values.
It is suggested to increase the present margin of 1 per
cent on either side of parity to about 2 to 3 per cent
(smaller band) or about 4 to 5 per cent (broader
band).
A combination of the “sliding parity” (“crawling
peg”) proposal with a widening of the margins is
known as a “movable band.”
Another solution of exchange rate flexibility has
been chosen by Canada and Germany outside the
Articles of Agreement of the IMF: freely or ma-
nipulated floating exchange rates limited to a single
country and/or to a certain period of time
With regard to the inter-relationship of economic
integration and exchange rate stability, the proposal
has been made to establish currency areas, each com-
prising a group of countries. Between such areas,
exchange rates would be freely, or within limits,
variable; within each group of countries parities
would be fixed without any adjustment procedure,
because of the close economic integration and
cooperation.
More Flexibility in the Methods
In the discussion on the optimum technique to be
followed in order to achieve better flexibihty, these
instruments have been considered so far. Neverthe-
less, it seems difficult to recommend the use of one
particular technique for all situations, as the motives
calling for smoother adaptation are manifold, and it
might be difficult to find any one device appropriate
in all cases. The crawling peg proposal, especially
the asymmetric upward type providing for only an
upward movement, for instance, may be appropriate
for offsetting differences in the rate at which different
countries’ cost levels are rising; there are, however,
doubts whether it really would discourage specula-
tion. The “widening of the margins” proposal, within
which exchange rates are pennitted to fluctuate
around their par values, would not solve the problems
created by long-run disparities of inflation rates in
different countries; it would deal effectively with
short-run disturbances and, by making possible losses
as well as gains, would be able to curb speculation
in foreign exchange. Wider bands may be suitable
to avoid the risk of irreversibility of changes in
parity, and thus would make it easier to adjust an
exchange rate in a way that, after the intervention
point had been reached, the rate might later on be
declared as the new parity. “Floating rates” (freely
or manipulated) anticipating exchange rate adjust-
ments are a device to avoid a period of speculation
as was the case in the recent Deutsche mark crisis
last September. Moreover, there wifi be cases where
the more frequent use of the present provisions may
be suitable under certain circumstances. In many
cases, the present adjustable peg will still remain the
best way to adjust a parity also in the future.
We should, therefore, be more flexible also in
choosing the method of achieving more exchange
rate flexibility. It should be proved whether it would
not be wise to leave the choice of the appropriate
instrument to the discretion of the Fund (IMP), in
close consultation with the countries concerned.
Proposed Amendment to the Articles
of Agreement
According to the currently valid provisions of Ar-
ticle IV, the suspension of a par value established
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in concurrence svith the Fund is not permitted, un-
less a new par value is agreed upon forthwith. If,
however, under exceptional circumstances, a country
cannot maintain the agreed parity, or the establish-
ment of a new parity or the adherence to the mar-
gins prescribed involves considerable risks, that
country may so inform the Fund and state that it
will temporarily not be in a position to fuffill the
obligations of Article IV, Sections 3 and 4. If the
Fund concludes that the arguments presented arc
convincing, it may make its view known, but it can-
not approve of the action of the member country.
Also, it is not clear whether the Fund, based on the
policy it has evolved over time, may in the course
of consultations with member countries recommend
changes in the par values of their currencies. The
power of the Fund to effect parity changes by action
under the exchange rate provisions of the Articles is
strictly limited to responding to proposals made by
members. If there is no proposal on the part of the
member, the Fund has no power undcr these provi-
sions to induce action with respect to a member’s
parity. It is generally considered that the Fund is not
regarded as being authorized to recommend to a
member to employ certain techniques of more flexi-
bility, even in cases when such a procedure would
protect the international monetary community (e.g.
the Deutsche mark case in the fall of 1969).
In order to terminate this legally unsatisfactory
situation which, incidentally, restricts the influence
the Fund may exert on such special situations. Article
IV could perhaps be amended by the insertion of a
new paragraph. It v’ould empower the Fund to ap-
prove or suggest, in close consultation with the coun-
try concerned, the temporary introduction of an
exchange rate formation deviating from the present
wording of Article IV, if such a step for the country
concerned appears justified in the light of prevailing
(specific) circumstances.
The admission or suggestion of one or another sys-
tem of limited flexibility could be based on the fol-
lowing criteria:
be of a character that
deemed appropriate to
in international money
2) The decision is to he made by the IMF in
close contact with the member concerned.
Strengthening the Authority of the IMP
Payments restrictions were introduced by member
states, though they are regarded by Article Io fthe
Articles of Agreement as measures destructive to na-
tional or international prosperity. Important decisions,
as for instance allowing exchange rates to fluctuate,
were not permitted by the Fund for lack of legal
possibilities, but had to be tolerated. These circum-
stances, in some quarters, led to the opinion that in
the long run the authority of the Fund may be weak-
ened. If we aim just at maintaining the regime of
rigid rates as it stands now, we rnn the risk of putting
at stake both of the most important achievements of
our present international monetary system: the con-
vertibility of important currencies, and the authority
of an international monetary institution. We should
keep in mind that the merit of Bretton Woods is not
only the achievement of having established a system
of fixed par values, but above all, the fact that it
was successful in setting up an international organiza-
tion to take care of the interests of the world’s mone-
tary community.
It would strengthen the authority of the IMF
if the decision on which method to choose for
achieving more flexibility would be left not just to
the country concerned, as practiced at present, but
also to the Fund. This would put the Fund into
the position to base its decision, if desirable, on cer-
tain conditions regarding the econonmic policy of the
country concerned, The Fund even would be able to
encourage exchange rate~~‘~djustments.Thus exchange
rate policy may, together with a set of other suitable
instruments, play its proper role in the adjustment
process.
Other Advantages of the Proposed Solution
It is unlikely that there will ever be general agree-
ment on an optimal method of flexibility applicable
to all cases. The amendment of the Articles of Agree-
ment as proposed here could, however, within a rela-
tively short period of time, he presented to and ex-
amined by the Board of Governors of the IMF and
recommended to the member countries for adoption.
The IMF could then be in a position to take into
account the special features of a given situation and
choose the method best qualified to deal with it in
close consultation with the country concerned.
It is not very likely that more flexibility leads to
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countries that have embarked on a policy of fluctuat-
ing rates have in practice generally stabilized their
rates within narrow limits over long periods of time.
Under the provisions suggested in this paper, the IMF
furthermore would be able to control that policy.
As the fate of the exchange rate system of Bretton
Woods demonstrates, it is difficult to foresee the at-
titudes of governments, central banks, the business
community and the public towards new international
regulations, If necessary, a change in the policy of
the IMF is relatively easy to affect. The various
methods for improvement of flexibility could make it
possible to gain new experience. The system of bin-
ited flexibility can be based on lessons learned from
experience gained in the pure par value system as
well as trom new experiments.
Such an amendment would provide for the small-
est change of the present system. There would not
be any direct changes concerning the majority of
countries not in need of increased flexibility at present.
And for those countries which, for whatever reasons,
shun adjustment of their par value by the current
method of the adjustable peg, there would be a
variety of other methods.
A greater flexibility within determined or deter-
minable limits is not only compatible with the gen-
eral principle of fixed exchange rates — the mainte-
nance of the present system even makes solutions
for special cases necessary. Limiting flexibility as to
space and time should allay the doubts of those who,
rightly or wrongly, fear the introduction of new fac-
tors of uncertainty into the international monetary
system. On the other hand, such a solution will also
permit the further evolution of those new methods
which prove to be useful.
The proposed amendment finally is compatible
‘with a general \videning of the bands, if the IMF
study comes to the conclusion that it would be useful.
Extent of the Slowdown — (Continuedfrom Page 5)
ten months ending May 1960. Fiscal actions remained
restrictive for more than a year after the recession
began. Money, however, began rising within two
months after the recession commenced. The 1960-61
recession was probably the mildest of the three pe-
riods of adjustment considered here; total spending
evidently responded to the moderate monetary ex-
pansion in spite of a large high-employment surplus.
1969— Fiscal actions changed from a stimulative
to a restrictive stance more than a year before August
1969, reflecting the 10 per cent surtax imposed in
mid-1968 and some cuts in the rate of Government
spending growth. The high-employment budget
moved from a large deficit in early 1968 ($14 billion
annual rate) to a surplus ($8 billion annual rate) in
the third quarter of 1969. However, it may be noted
that the surplus after mid-1969 was far less in rela-
tion to total spending than in the 1961-63 period,
when the nation recovered from recession.
According to the plan outlined in the President’s
current budget, fiscal actions are to remain moder-
ately restrictive through 1970. The high-employment
budget in the first half of the year is estimated to
remain near the $9 billion rate of surplus level
reached in the last half of 1969 and then rise to about
a $13 billion rate in the last half of 1970. Social se-
curity outlays are scheduled to increase in the second
quarter, and the tax surcharge is scheduled to expire
in July, but these expansionary actions are to be more
than offset by curtailment in the growth of Govern-
ment spending.
The influence of the Government on total spending
may turn out to be moderately expansionary in 1970.
Attainment of fiscal restraint is dependent on the
willingness of Congress to limit spending to the
amount proposed in the high-employment budget
plan. Also, even if the plan is followed and the econ-
omy weakens, tax receipts may be less than antici-
pated in the plan, causing the unified and national
income accounts budgets to indicate a more expan-
sionary eflect on tho economy. According to one view,
this automatic stabilization feature of Government
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tax receipts tends to have a desirable stabilizing ef-
fect on total spending, and accordingly would not be
reason for alteration of the high-employmnent budget
plan.
Defense spending is expected to decline from 9
per cent of- total spending in 1967 and 1968 to 7.5
per cent in 1970, while the nondefense portion of
total spending is planned to rise from 11.5 per cent
in 1967 to 13 per cent in 1970.
Monetary actions were only moderately restrictive
before August 1969, In the seven months ending with
August, money rose at a 2.8 per cent annual rate.
This was faster than immediately before any of the
three recessions reviewed, but was considerably less
than the rapid 7 per cent rate of increase during the
preceding two years. From last August to Febrnary
money rose at less than a 1 per cent rate, which is
faster than in the first six months after the 1957 peak
and about the same as after the 1953 and 1960 highs.
Adjusted for declines in the purchasing power of
money, monetary actions have been similar to those
around other recent cyclical peaks. Money in real
terms declined at a 2.3 per cent annual rate in the
seven mnonths before August 1969 and at a 3.5 per
cent rate in the first six months after August. In the
corresponding seven months before the three previous
Conclusions
Is the economy in a recession or in a pause?
The answer to this question cannot be conclusively
settled at this time (early March). Complete inter-
pretation of recent and current events depends on
developments in the near future. However, evidence
is growing that real output is continuing to decline
in early 1970, and that the late-1969 to early-1970
period may ultimately be termed a recession.
A review of widely used economic measures
through the months of January and February shows
some similarities between the current situation and
the three previous recessions, but most yardsticks in-
dicate that the slowdown has been milder than in
the early months of the three most recent recessions.
On the other hand, the current hesitation already
appears to be slightly greater than the 1962 and 1967
pauses in economic activity, neither of which was
severe enough to be termed a recession.
Whether the current downtuni remains milder than
the earlier recessions, matches them, or becomes more
severe depends on many factors. The course of de-
velopments in the economy over the rest of the year
will be influenced by recent and forthcoming Gov-
ernment stabilization actions. Recent fiscal actions
have been moderately restrictive, and are expected
to change only slightly in the near future. But in the
past, fiscal actions alone have not been consistently
related either to recession or expansion. For example,
business cycles, the average contraction of money in
real terms was also at a 2.3 per cent rate, and in the
six months after the turn the contraction was at a 2.4
per cent rate.
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the mini-recession of early-1967 occurred when fiscal
actions were the most stimulative in over two decades,
and total spending continued to rise rapidly in late
1968 and early 1969 despite a sharp shift toward fiscal
restraint.
Monetary actions have. also been moderately re-
strictive, but less so than during the corresponding
periods around any of the three previous cyclical
peaks. From December 1968 to February this year
money rose at a 2.1 per cent annual rate. By com-
parison, money declined at a 0.3 per cent average
rate in the corresponding 14-month periods around
the three previous peaks. Assuming money has begun
rising at a moderate rate, past experience suggests that
the current “recession” will be the least severe of any
in the past two decades.
Along with the interruption in production growth,
the country continues to suffer from continued infla-
tion. The inflation was caused by excessive spending,
stimulated by expansionary fiscal and monetary de-
velopments from 1964 through 1968.1 Despite a slow-
ing in the growth of spending in late 1969 and early
1970, the rate of overall price increase has continued
at about the 5 per cent rate attained in early 1969.
Some prices were held back during the period of
excessive spending by regulations (for example, pub-
lic utility rates), by contracts (prices 6f sonic mate-
rials and labor services), and by public opinion or a
money illusion. As these prices move up, they place
cost-push pressures on some other prices, causing
inflation to continue after the excessive spending is
eliminated.
Experience indicates that inflation can be elimi-
nated only slowly, and that success in reducing it
will take great patience and the avoidance of exces-
sive policy actions. During the recessions of 1958 and
1960, price increases continued despite a pronounced
reduction in demand for goods and services. Whether
tm
See Norman N. Bowsher, “1969-Battle Against Infiation” in
the December 1969 issue of this Review, pp. 2-12.
and how soon the inflation will now be eliminated
depends on mnany factors, such as avoidance of
strongly expansionary fiscal or monetary actions, cor-
rection of imbalances from past actions, and the
atrophy of expectations of further price advances.
This review of previous recessions indicates that
long-term interest rates tend to recede slowly. Yields
on highest-grade seasoned corporate bonds averaged
about 7.8 per cent in the three months ending with
February. Price expectations have been a major fac-
tor affecting the level of interest rates,2 When bor-
rowers expect prices to rise, they are willing to pay
higher interest rates, because equipment and mate-
rials will cost more later, Any stimulative effect of
higher rates on saving is offset by anticipated future
reductions in the purchasing power of funds. In pre-
vious recessions long-term rates drifted lower only
slowly as inflationary expectations receded. In the
1957-1958 period, for example, interest rates on high-
est-grade corporate bonds decreased from a peak
average of 4.1 per cent in the third quarter of 1957 to
a trough of 3,6 per cent three quarters later. These
interest rates fell from a high of 4.6 per cent in the
last quarter of 1959 to a trough of 4,3 per cent in the
first quarter of 1961. Short-term rates in each reces-
sion declined more sharply than long-term rates.
In summary, the economic pause since last August
has been milder than during the three previous reces-
sions, Experience from previous periods when the
growth rate of money has slowed indicates that the
contraction may go on for a quarter or more, and
that continued monetary restraint would intensify
the magnitude and duration of the downturn. On the
other hand, if progress is to be made in moderating
the rapid increases in prices, excessively rapid in-
creases in money, such as occurred in 1967 and 1968,
must be avoided.
2
See William P. Yohe and Denis S. Karnosky, “Interest Rates
and Price Level Changes, 1952-69” in the December 1969
issue of this Review, pp. 18-38.
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